Pathological Politics and the Future of World Order
Time and again, Aftershocks hammers home how democratic and authoritarian states responded to COVID-19 in pathological ways—prioritizing competition and ideology over cooperation and science, pursuing beggar-thy-neighbor policies rather than collective action, blaming others over taking responsibility, spreading disinformation instead of creating shared truth, and mouthing platitudes about equity while watching death counts grow.
However, the most powerful drivers of this behavior—geopolitical and ideological competition internationally and nationalism and populism domestically—pre-date COVID-19 and, in many ways, have been made worse by this disaster. If, as Kahl and Wright suggest, better pandemic preparedness depends on how the United States competes geopolitically, then the aftershocks of the pandemic might fade in a U.S. foreign policy fixated on the balance of power.
The aftershocks of the pandemic might fade in a U.S. foreign policy fixated on the balance of power
This dynamic might be at play even before the pandemic is over. Given mounting concerns about the role of the United States in world affairs, The Economist is featuring essays by global thinkers , such as Henry Kissinger and Francis Fukuyama, on the future of American power. None of the ten commentaries published as of August 31 engages in any serious way with the pandemic—the most disruptive global event since World War II. Can we already sense that, as with the Great Influenza, pandemic aftershocks quickly become afterthoughts when the great powers confront the challenge of forging a new international order?
Full article here.
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Let's not forget the point from the beginning:
These food shortages and economic consequences were NOT as a result of covid-19. They are a result of intentional government actions that were not needed! They were implemented by our governments on the behalf of the International Organisations that conduct the global affairs.